I like a well-reasoned opinion, but I love one that includes a smackdown of lefty hack judges.
The decision comes to us via Gabe Malor at Hot Air, and can be read here (.pdf). Basically, as Gabe explains: “Like the now-vacated decision in Halbig, the judge in Pruitt could not find any statutory authority for IRS to offer tax subsidies to individuals that purchased insurance on the federal exchanges.” The judge also had some pointed words for lefty judges who had taken a contrary position:
Other judges in similar litigation have cast the plaintiffs’ argument in apocalyptic language. The first sentence of Judge Edwards’ dissent in Halbig is as follows: “This case is about Appellants’ not-so-veiled attempt to gut the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (‘ACA’).” Concurring in King, Judge Davis states that “[a]ppellants’ approach would effectively destroy the statute . . . .” Further, “[w]hat [appellants] may not do is rely on our help to deny to millions of Americans desperately-needed health insurance. . .” Id.
Of course, a proper legal decision is not a matter of the court “helping” one side or the other. A lawsuit challenging a federal regulation is a commonplace occurrence in this country, not an affront to judicial dignity. A higher-profile case results in greater scrutiny of the decision, which is understandable and appropriate. “[H]igh as those stakes are, the principle of legislative supremacy that guides us is higher still. . . This limited role serves democratic interests by ensuring that policy is made by elected, politically accountable representatives, not by appointed life-tenured judges.”
This is a case of statutory interpretation. “The text is what it is, no matter which side benefits.” Such a case (even if affirmed on the inevitable appeal) does not “gut” or “destroy” anything. On the contrary, the court is upholding the Act as written.
Boom. Bold type is mine, underlining is the judge’s.
Jonathan “speak-o” Gruber makes an appearance in another footnote:
The court permitted plaintiff to supplement the record with statements made by Professor Jonathan 24 Gruber, who was involved in the ACA’s drafting. (#115). It is evidently undisputed that in January, 2012, Prof. Gruber made the statement “if you’re a state and you don’t set up an Exchange, that means your citizens don’t get their tax credits.” What is disputed is whether Prof. Gruber’s statement was “off the cuff.” The statement evidently has now been disavowed on his part. In any event, the court does not consider this statement as reflecting “legislative intent” (a concept in which the court has little faith anyway) because Prof. Gruber is not a member of Congress and his statement was made after the Act had passed. The court takes the statement for the limited relevance of words of interpretation, not intent. That is to say, the statement cuts against any argument that the plaintiff’s interpretation is absurd on its face, or that plaintiff’s argument that the statutory language might support a reading of “incentivizing” states to set up exchanges is “nonsense, made up out of whole cloth.” Halbig, 758 F.3d at 414 (Edwards, J., dissenting).
I love all the stuff in bold (bold type is mine). Along those lines, the judge also has a few words for those misguided souls (mostly leftists these days) who believe that “intent” is the proper way to interpret statutory language. Long-time readers will recall that I forcefully argued against such a position in 2010 — and encountered a considerable amount of flak for doing so. Today, it seems, I have been vindicated, and a footnote in the judge’s opinion helps explain why my position was right:
Moreover, legislative history may not be used to create ambiguity in the statutory language. See 16 St. Charles Inv. Co. v. C.I.R., 232 F.3d 773, 776 (10 Cir.2000). “Our role in construing statutes was then summarized by Justice Holmes: ‘We do not inquire what the legislature meant; we ask only what the statute means.’” Id. (citations omitted).
Judge Easterbrook has expressed the outer limits of this skepticism: “Legislative intent is a fiction, a back-formation from other and often undisclosed sources. Every legislator has an intent, which usually cannot be discovered, since most say nothing before voting on most bills; and the legislature is a collective body that does not have a mind; it ‘intends’ only that the text be adopted, and statutory texts usually are compromises that match no one’s first preference.” Frank H. Easterbrook, foreword to Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts, by Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, xxii (1 ed.2012)(emphasis in original).
Bold type is mine. This sounds very similar to what I said in 2010:
Things get even uglier when you’re talking about legislative intent, because you’re looking at the intent of a body of people who might not even have an intent — other than “I am voting this way to get re-elected.” Most of these clowns haven’t even read the words that their intent is supposedly so critical to interpreting. Some legislators’ intent is going to be at odds with others’. Some will have traded favors or spent political capital negotiating a change to the text — and it is the height of insanity to tell such people that their negotiated TEXTUAL modifications are null and void because a majority of legislators happens to unreasonably read that same text in a way different than most reasonable people would.
And so the point boils down to this: to the intentionalist, the meaning of words written on a page is wholly determined by what the writer intended them to mean. But in the real world, when a judge has to decide how those words are going to be ENFORCED, he is going to start with the text — and he may very well end with the text.
Whatever unwarranted opposition I might have faced in the blogosphere for this position, this is the view that I believe will ultimately carry the day for five Justices. Excellent work by federal District Judge Ronald A. White. It’s not every day that you can say this, so I’m pleased to do so when I can: three cheers for a job well done by the federal judiciary.