A unique and sensible way of looking at the statistics.

[C]orrelation obviously doesn’t equal causation; there may be lots of other factors that are the true causes of both of the things that are being measured. But if we do look for now at correlation, it seems to me that the key question should focus on state total homicide rates, or perhaps (for reasons I describe below) total intentional homicide plus accidental gun death rates. And it turns out that there is essentially zero correlation between these numbers and state gun laws.

Read it all.

Eugene Volokh has a giant list of would-be mass shooters stopped in their tracks by (you’ll never guess) . . . people with guns. Number seven blew my mind. (Not really; I’m just practicing my BuzzFeed-style clickbait phrases. This one weird trick prevented a mass shooting!) In all seriousness, though, here is number seven:

7. In Colorado Springs, Colo., in 2007, Matthew Murray killed four people at a church. He was then shot several times by Jeanne Assam, a church member, volunteer security guard and former police officer (she had been dismissed by a police department 10 years before, and to my knowledge hadn’t worked as a police officer since). Murray, knocked down and badly wounded, killed himself; it is again not clear whether he would have killed more people had he not been wounded, but my guess is that he would have (UPDATE: he apparently went to the church with more than 1,000 rounds of ammunition).

That’s a lot of rounds of ammunition. Volokh also notes:

Many mass shootings happen in supposedly “gun-free” zones (such as schools, universities or private property posted with a no-guns sign), in which gun carrying isn’t allowed.

Indeed. As I have noted, the Oregon community college was a de facto gun-free zone — and any argument that the student code of conduct allowed guns ignores several facts:

1. Even the hacks at Raw Story admitted: “Beyond the veterans’ community, however, other students said they were convinced the campus was in fact gun-free, citing the school’s code of conduct and the broader culture among the roughly 3,000 full-time students.”

2. The university president thought it was a gun-free campus (watch the video at 3:07). Why wouldn’t the students?

3. The folks who point to the language in the student code of conduct stating “except as expressly authorized by law or college regulations” as a loophole ignore the fact that there is nothing in state law that expressly authorized guns on campus — particularly in buildings. That court decision we heard so much about — the one that invalidated one regulation on narrow grounds of pre-emption — “didn’t directly address community colleges like UCC” even according to the plaintiff. What’s more, the decision itself says that a concealed carry permit does not constitute authorization to carry a firearm on campus — in particular in campus buildings — saying: “We reject the contention that a statutory exception to criminal sanctions for the possession of a handgun in public buildings indicates an intention to require public educational institutions to permit concealed handguns.” (This has confused many people who have read news stories but not the court’s decision.) And the Guardian has written that: “The following year [after the court decision], the Oregon state board of higher education approved a policy that banned guns from being brought inside campus buildings.” You’d have to look pretty hard to find anything “express” in the court decision. Simplistic citations to the concealed carry law cause people to say wrong things that are at odds with the language of the court decision itself.

So you’re left with the following:

• A bevy of anecdotes from Volokh in which people stopped mass shootings with guns;

• Statistics showing only 8% of mass shootings since 2009 occurred in places where people can defend themselves with guns; and

• A clear policy at Umpqua that guns were prohibited on campus.

It’s a shame. And it will keep happening as long as the leftists respond to every such shooting with a call to confiscate firearms outright.

It’s the ultimate in leftist thought: policy based on FEEEELZ, and the facts be damned.

P.S. As for Vox (see last link) saying we need to confiscate guns to bring us to European levels of mass gun violence: I don’t think we want European levels of mass gun violence. Adjusted for population, they are worse.

Eugene Volokh has a very interesting and illuminating post regarding the application of religious freedom laws to Kim Davis’s objection to issuing marriage licenses. I think this is the heart of his post:

[I]f Davis has a federal constitutional duty to issue marriage licenses, she wouldn’t be able to get a religious exemption from that duty, and decline to issue such licenses at all — denying County residents their constitutional right would certainly be an “undue hardship” imposed on the County and its citizens, and requiring her to comply with the Constitution would be the least restrictive means of serving the compelling interest in protecting citizens’ constitutional rights.

Yet besides her losing claim in the federal lawsuit, it seems to me that Davis has a much stronger claim under state law for a much more limited exemption. Davis’s objection, it appears (see pp. 40 and 133 of her stay application and attachments), is not to issuing same-sex marriage licenses as such. Rather, she objects to issuing such licenses with her name on them, because she believes (rightly or wrongly) that having her name on them is an endorsement of same-sex marriage. Indeed, she says that she would be content with

Modifying the prescribed Kentucky marriage license form to remove the multiple references to Davis’ name, and thus to remove the personal nature of the authorization that Davis must provide on the current form.

Now this would be a cheap accommodation that, it seems to me, a state could quite easily provide.

Before reading Volokh’s analysis, I was unaware that there was arguably a solution that simple, which would accommodate her objections and still ensure that licenses be issued. Elsewhere I have read posts that suggest to the contrary, such as this at SCOTUSblog:

Davis’s religious complaint all along has been that, because Kentucky law requires her name and signature to be on every marriage license issued in her county, issuing licenses to any couples would involve her directly in authorizing same-sex couples to marry, which would violate her belief that God has made marriage an institution only for a man and a woman. She thus adopted a no-licensing policy and ordered her deputies to follow the policy as well.

I think my instinct on this lines up pretty well with what Volokh says the law is. He says the law on religious accommodation requires “judgments of degree” and “turns on the specific facts present in a particular workplace.” If there is no solution other than that the clerk has to sign the license for it to be valid, then in my view the clerk must do her job or resign. If there is a feasible solution — and Volokh suggests there is — then her beliefs should be accommodated.

There are a lot of annoying nuances to the analysis, having to do with the type of lawsuit that would have to be filed, who would have to file it, and where they would have to file it. Apparently it’s not as simple as simply telling the federal judge who is jailing her that she needs an accommodation. Volokh says she would have to go off to state court and file her own lawsuit to get an accommodation. That seems like cold comfort to someone literally in jail. And it shows, in my judgment, that the judge was too hasty to throw her in jail when there was the possibility of exploring possible accommodations.

The bottom line for me remains the same. I have said that “the licenses must be issued, and if no accommodation is possible, she can’t simply refuse. If government officials simply refuse to carry out their functions, the system breaks down.” But I have also said that if an accommodation is possible and feasible, it should be made. Volokh’s analysis shows that the law agrees with my instinct.

Where I part ways with some of my friends is to say that if I see lawlessness in one area, that justifies my applauding lawlessness in another area. This leads to the breakdown of society. I stand by my statement: “the way to respond to lawlessness is to end it, not to emulate it.” If this can be done with an accommodation to religious objections — and according to Volokh it can — then that’s what ought to happen.

[guest post by Dana]

Via Instapundit, more warnings about what should and should not be said on UC campuses. They alone know what people really mean when they speak. No free sharing of ideas allowed because hurt feelings:

One of the latest things in universities, including at University of California (where I teach) is condemning “microaggressions,” supposed “brief, subtle verbal or non-verbal exchanges that send denigrating messages to the recipient because of his or her group membership (such as race, gender, age or socio-economic status).” Such microaggressions, the argument goes, can lead to a “hostile learning environment,” which UC — and the federal government — views as legally actionable. This is stuff you could get disciplined or fired for, especially if you aren’t a tenured faculty member.

But of course this concept is now being used to suppress not just, say, personal insults or discrimination in hiring or grading, but also ideas that the UC wants to exclude from university classrooms. . . .

Well, I’m happy to say that I’m just going to keep on microaggressing. I like to think that I’m generally polite, so I won’t express these views rudely. And I try not to inject my own irrelevant opinions into classes I teach, so there are many situations in which I won’t bring up these views simply because it’s not my job to express my views in those contexts. But the document that I quote isn’t about keeping classes on-topic or preventing presonal insults — it’s about suppressing particular viewpoints. And what’s tenure for, if not to resist these attempts to stop the expression of unpopular views?

The first step is admitting you have a problem, right? Then you can start recognizing the microaggressions and the hurtful messages being sent:

[Theme:] Myth of Meritocracy[:] Statements which assert that race or gender does not play a role in life successes, for example in issues like faculty demographics.

[Microaggression Examples:] “I believe the most qualified person should get the job.”

“Of course he’ll get tenure, even though he hasn’t published much — he’s Black!”

“Men and women have equal opportunities for achievement.”

“Gender plays no part in who we hire.”

“America is the land of opportunity.”

“Everyone can succeed in this society, if they work hard enough.”

“Affirmative action is racist.”

Quickly, here is what this, and so many other similar situations, make me think for the thousandth time: At one time, institutions of higher education provided a place for young people to be intellectually challenged and stimulated by new ideas. They learned to critically think through these challenges while forming their own opinions. Whether or not they agreed with what was presented was not the point. These exercises were encouraged and valued as recognized efforts (and responsibilities!) to stretch and strengthen and produce a more well-rounded young adult who would be able to succeed in a mean and unfair world. This is no longer so. Today’s social engineers are instead attempting to shape the mean world into something that indulges young people’s newly acquired Sensitivities. Sensitivities which convince them that they are the injured party, thus making it the world around them that must become kinder and gentler to accommodate them. There is no longer an expectation to be provided with the necessary tools to help them gain a solid foothold in the unfairness of real life. No longer are these provided because no longer are they wanted. Young people are essentially being taught a particular type weakness and fear which will keep them in a perpetual state of childishness. The blinding arrogance of those in charge does no one any favors. And we will continue to pay a hefty price for their ongoing foolishness.

Anyway, here’s hoping that an army of Volokhs come forth and make their dissent known.

–Dana

Eugene Volokh has a long and typically sensible post about “conversations on race” at his Washington Post blog, titled Let’s have a national conversation about race — so we can figure out whom to fire. The springboard for his post is the firing of a North Carolina fire investigator for writing, on her personal Facebook page, that Michael Brown was a “thug” — and criticizing the Obama administration for sending representatives to Brown’s funeral. Volokh writes that he thinks she is “likely to prevail” in the lawsuit she is contemplating against her government employers. Volokh then quotes at length from a 2010 post he wrote about the legal pitfalls of engaging in one of those “conversations about race” around the water cooler.

At the end, Eugene has an update:

UPDATE: Commenter MDJ23 writes:

I think you are taking the national conversation or water cooler suggestion too literally. The point is that those who have suffered racial discrimination should speak out, not that those who have not should speak out — the latter’s role should mostly be to listen. Some might call that a lecture; I’d call it an education.

Oh, that’s the “conversation” that people are contemplating — this helps explain things.

Heh. Well, of course that’s the conversation they want — and Eugene knows that. He’s just making his point with a rhetorical flourish of extreme understatement, which is both safe and effective (sounds like the properties of a good over-the-counter medication, doesn’t it?).

The one side doesn’t really want to hear from the other. They want to talk at us — lecture, “educate,” or whatever — and they want us to shut up and listen.

I myself have expressed in the past a desire to not have a national conversation on race. Here are a couple of examples of why.

Last year, when a black columnist wrote a column about “rules” for engaging in such a conversation, it turned out that her “rules” addressed only how to talk to black people. (She described her column as “even-handed” because it told both whites and blacks how to talk to black people about race.) I asked her if she had any rules for talking to white people, and she told me to write them myself and then blocked me on Twitter. (Hooray for “conversations”!)

I was called a “racist” in 2009 when I described Henry Louis Gates as a “high-on-himself Harvard professor” based on the arresting officer’s statement:

Gates then turned to me and told me that I had no idea who I was ‘messing’ with and that I had not heard the last of it.

I have had the delightful experience of having people complain to my employer that I am a racist. This has happened on more than one occasion. Fortunately, my employers have been more sensible than the employers of the fire investigator in North Carolina.

When we reform our legal system so that conversations on race are not an invitation to frivolous lawsuits, let me know, and maybe I’ll engage. Until then, I’ll pass, thanks.

Losing Ezra Klein, gaining Eugene Volokh & Co. That’s trading up.

Huzzah!

I’m pleased to say that I’ll be consulting with Aaron Walker’s defense lawyer in the case I discussed last week, in which a Maryland judge issued a “peace order” — in other states, generally called a “restraining order” — that the judge seemed to interpret as limiting Aaron Walker’s blogging about Brett Kimberlin. (See, e.g., this audio recording, starting at 46:01.)

The order prohibiting Aaron from blogging will, of course, be reversed. It’s just a question of when.

What is needed is an immediate stay of the unconstitutional portions of the judge’s order, and an injunction against Kimberlin’s seeking another peace order based on public speech about a public figure.

In the meantime, I advise Eugene to be careful. These aren’t your average Internet opponents. They’re dangerous, nasty, evil people, and they will probably try to come after him on a personal level, as they do with anyone who tries to help us.

UPDATE: Forgot to add, the good Professor is doing this pro bono. Good for him.

Eugene Volokh has deftly isolated the major flaw in the recent L.A. Times article on DNA, cold cases, and statistics.

In my original post I quoted the language from the article that most disturbed me:

At Puckett’s trial earlier this year, the prosecutor told the jury that the chance of such a coincidence was 1 in 1.1 million.

Jurors were not told, however, the statistic that leading scientists consider the most significant: the probability that the database search had hit upon an innocent person.

In Puckett’s case, it was 1 in 3.

. . . .

In every cold hit case, the panels advised, police and prosecutors should multiply the Random Match Probability (1 in 1.1 million in Puckett’s case) by the number of profiles in the database (338,000). That’s the same as dividing 1.1 million by 338,000.

For Puckett, the result was dramatic: a 1-in-3 chance that the search would link an innocent person to the crime.

In my original post I said:

It seems to me that the conclusion does not logically follow at all. The formulation simply can’t be right. The suggestion appears to be that the larger the database, the greater the chance is that the hit you receive will be a hit to an innocent person. I think that the larger the database, the greater the probability of getting a hit. Then, once you have the hit, the question becomes: how likely is it that the hit is just a coincidence?

Volokh explains the ridiculous nature of the L.A. Times‘s formulation with an excellent example:

Here’s one way of seeing this: Let’s say that the prosecution comes up with a vast amount of other evidence against Pickett — he admitted the crime in a letter to a friend; items left at the murder site are eventually tied to him; and more. He would still, though, have been found through a search of a 338,000-item DNA database, looking for a DNA profile that is possessed by 1/1,100,000 of the population — and under the article’s assertion, “the probability that the database search had hit upon an innocent person” would still have been “1 in 3.”

Despite all the other evidence that the police would have found, and even if the prosecutors didn’t introduce the DNA evidence, there would be, under the article’s description, a 1/3 chance that the search had hit upon an innocent person (Pickett), and thus a 1/3 chance that Pickett was innocent, presumably more than enough for an acquittal. That can’t, of course, be right. But that just reflects the fact that 1/3 is not “the probability that the database search had hit upon an innocent person.” It’s the probability that a search would have come up with someone innocent if the rapist wasn’t in the database.

I think that’s exactly it. I believe the reason is that inclusion of a known guilty person in the database corrupts the math involved in pure probabilities of finding an innocent person.

I think Eugene has hit upon an actual error in the piece with this, and not just a matter that’s open to debate. I don’t think they would ever correct it, because they have a history of failing to correct errors if the explanation of the error is long and difficult — even if it’s unquestionably an error. Still, when I have more time, I’ll follow up on this more.

Read Volokh’s entire post, which has other illuminating insights, here. Previous posts on this subject here, here, and here.

He has a post about it with a clever title: The New 7 1/2. Cute.

Hey, look. It’s Jack Balkin and Eugene Volokh talking constitutional law on BloggingHeads.tv.

I hate to say that my overwhelming reaction was superficial: I saw Balkin and thought: wow, he’s lost a ton of weight since he was my Con Law professor at Texas. He looks great. Older (as we all do), but great.

My other superficial reaction was: man, Eugene, let Jack get in a word edgewise!

But really, it’s a great discussion. If you’re into the Second Amendment and the First Amendment and all those amendments, it’s great fun.