Iraq and Economic Theory?
Just had a thought regarding Kerry’s claim that Bush should have gotten more allies involved in the attack on Hussein… brought on by watching Jerry Brown on H&C claim that, had Bush done it the right way, instead of suffering 90% of the casualties and 90% of the cost, the United States would have only had to incur 40%…
It involves economic theory, none of which is easy to explain and some of which I actually know, so bear with me.
There’s an economic concept called the ‘free-rider’, an example of which is the homeowner who knows that, if his house were to catch fire, the local fire department will show up – regardless of whether he’s kicked in anything to their fundraising drive… so he doesn’t. A variation of this is what I call the ‘partial free rider’, the person who pays less than their ‘fair’ share, knowing that they don’t have to pay the full ride but wishing for whatever benefits might accrue to those paying (something).
There’s also a field of economic (and social) study that involves something called ‘game theory’ which holds that players involved in a particular situation determine their course of action in large part by how they anticipate the actions to be taken by the other players. The best known example of this is the prisoner’s dilemma.
Let’s combine these two theories and apply them to what was going on with Iraq.
Let’s stipulate that France, Germany and Russia (three countries that sat the conflict out) did in fact want Hussein removed from power (or, at the very least, were not hostile to the idea). Applying the free rider theory, Chirac, Putin and Shroeder, all sensing that Bush was going ahead regardless of whether they offered help, chose the obvious (in hindsight) course of action: become full free-riders on Bush’s most excellent adventure. They let Bush do the heavy lifting, suffer the casualties, incur the costs, take the political heat. All benefit, no cost – not a bad deal.
Assuming of course, that Bush wanted their help, how then would Bush (or Kerry, for that matter) have been able to get their support?
Bush could have done this by sending signals that he wasn’t completely sold on the idea of going it alone, that he needed a little nudge, a sign of support from his ‘allies’ that they would back him up if he made up his mind to go ahead. The way this might have played out is for Bush to take some action – such as going to the UN for that last Security Council Resolution – that required the allies to make some form of commitment – such as agreeing to support that last Security Council Resolution.
Game theory holds that FG&R, not knowing if Bush were serious about needing help, or perhaps not being sure that Bush would proceed even if they did offer their help, would want to offer up the smallest amount of support. This way, if Bush was to back off his threats against Iraq, they would not be out naked on the limb. If Bush was bluffing about needing their help, they would naturally call him on that bluff and refuse any further support. And, finally, if Bush were serious about needing and wanting help, they would still prefer to make the smallest possible gesture that Bush could interpret as being supportive. Supporting that final Security Council Resolution would work under all three scenarios.
Now one of the wrinkles in game theory occurs when the players have different levels of information, or when the situation is not quite the same for all the players (as it would be in the Prisoner’s dilemma if it took place in Calfornia and one of the two suspects was already a two time felon). With the situation at hand, we find that Bush had indeed put himself at a disadvantage; with his call (along the lines of) that ‘resolutions have to mean something’, Bush had given F,G&R that he was committed to taking action. Having said that, he couldn’t back down – regardless of whether France, Germany and/or Russia followed through on or abandoned their earlier signs of support.
My conclusion? It seems all so obvious and clear in hindsight. There was no way that France, Germany or Russia would have signed on to support the invasion of Iraq – no matter who was President. For as soon as the President sent the signal that they were serious – which he had to do in order to convince France, Germany and Russia to sign on for even the most preliminary steps – he removed whatever leverage he might have had in getting those countries to participate.
Under this scenario, Kerry is wrong when he blames Bush for the mess we’re in. If anything, Kerry ought to be blaming the laws of economics.
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Just a question: isn’t it reasonable to believe that if Saddam Hussein had actually posed the sort of threat that we claimed he did, that Russia, Germany, and France might’ve felt more compelled, in the interest of their own national security, to jump on board?
Remember that we didn’t even convince the UN council that action was warranted. I’ll bet that if our ‘intelligence’ were more credible, compelling, or simply convincing, that at the least, the UN would have authorized action in Iraq.
Patterico has been really big on a mantra that goes like this: ‘correlation does not mean causation.’ In this case, just because this situation you pose is feasible doesn’t make it necessarily likely. I think it’s far more likely that they simply didn’t find Hussein to be the threat that we said he was, especially considering that he never was.
Tom (4a3c50) — 10/1/2004 @ 9:16 pmRegarding Russia, Germany and France’s interests, three words: Oil-For-Food.
– – –
In 2002, the UN Council, by a unanimous vote, passed resolution 1441, authorizing action in Iraq.
http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2002/SC7564.doc.htm
arb (7f9c71) — 10/1/2004 @ 9:28 pmHe wasn’t shooting at French, German, or Russian planes daily, nor was he openly threatening their countries with anything whatsoever.
France wouldn’t have been worried if he’d had a few nuclear devices. Because they were way, way down ‘the list’.
Al (98e4ad) — 10/1/2004 @ 10:07 pmI applaud your application of Economic and game theory to this question. As a former (successful)Econ major, I tend to apply an economic filters to issues all the time. However, I believe you have made an error in assuming that F,G & R wanted Saddam out of power in Iraq. As poster arb says, F, G & R had a vested and profitable interest in keeping Saddam in power in Iraq. The leaders and their cronies were profiting from the current situation.
Thanks for the guest blogging, I would know what to do without my daily dose of Patterico. I’ll check out your site too.
Chuck (963157) — 10/1/2004 @ 10:22 pmArb is right, Steve. Your post is predicated on the assumption that those countries wanted Saddam out, but they quite evidently did not — it would have upset the gravy train.
Patterico (3ba6fc) — 10/1/2004 @ 11:40 pmInteresting justification. I have had another thought regarding the Iraq, quagmire, “go it alone” thoughts of Kerry.
First, it seems that Kerry says that Iraq is a quagmire due to the fact that approximately 1,100 soldiers have died. How many U.S. soldiers died in taking Iraq out of Kuwait?
The argument may sound cold, but if our casulties are less than they were 12 years ago after 18 months of occupation (okay liberation for Senator Zell) aren’t we ahead?
They follow-up corralation is that since U.S. soldiers are the best trained and most effecient, is it possible that fewer is better? Though there are 4 different branches of service in the U.S., they always train together and may be more efficient than U.S. Marines working with Korean Navy.
beach bum (29162b) — 10/2/2004 @ 2:45 amregardless of the economic entalgement france had, the game theory aspect still holds. seeing that the us was serious, why get involved in such a mess. terrorism is fast becoming everyone’s problem, including france and russia. therefore they will all benefit in the long run from middle east transformation. if they don’t have to flip the bill, or pay any of the political costs, all the better.
if you take that with the econmic interests to begin with, lol, they were NEVER gonna budge.
jason (1d7b5b) — 10/2/2004 @ 2:59 amThe game theory assumes that all parties have COMMON INTEREST.
It is not exaggeration to say that France envisions itself as a counter force to the American ‘hyperpower’. Even a common interest in arresting terror might be outweighed by French interest in damaging US prestige while increasing their own. Stalling an American intervention in Iraq was a gamble with little downside, as the French saw it.
Western Europe shared, generally, fears of interruption of Mideast oil and unrest in Europe’s indigenous Muslim populations. Anti-Americanism had already been fired up in Afghanistan and could be counted upon to buttress any arguments France made for obstructionism.
France and Germany appeared to control the mechanisms of the EU and could exert influence in NATO, which France could hope to diminish, as well. In addition, France benefitted more than any other nation from Iraqi oil and contracts. The loss of their particular advantages in Iraq would play heavily against nebulous expectations from a Iraq without Saddam.
The rump state of Russia, formerly a world power, also had interests that did not coincide with cooperation with the power against which it had long struggled.
Western encroachment in the former Warsaw pact nations, through NATO and EU membership posed a strategic threat. US friendliness to some new nations formed in the breakup of the USSR also threatened Russia with encirclement and containment within non-aligned and not necessarily friendly nations. Removal of Saddam would end a lucrative market for weapons and affect a waning Russian influence in that area. Damaging US interests there , again, had little downside for Russia.
Least clear, to me, is the motivation for German opposition. Their interests in Iraq were far less lucrative than France’s and less vital strategically than Russia’s. Still, ideology and rampant anti-Americanism there (and their effect on an election) mitigated against complete support, even had US reasoning been accepted as faultless.
With these understandings accepted, it is difficult to envision how the US might have maneuvered to gain support from such ‘allies’. Supporting the US would have increased her influence while not really enhancing that of France or Russia. Indeed, they might both have lost both influence abroad and at home.
Thomas Hazlewood (8c22f4) — 10/2/2004 @ 4:32 amTomas, Schroeder’s opposition to the hyperpower was one of his parties political planks. Help the French obstructionism vs. help the Americans -> not a close call.
Al (98e4ad) — 10/2/2004 @ 9:03 amI agree with the game theory application and think it also applies to several Arab nations. Egypt, the Saudis, et al., feared Saddam yet could not oppose him militarily or politically. So they cheer behind the scenes now that he’s gone and denounce us in public, and rack up political points at home.
Patricia (133563) — 10/2/2004 @ 9:13 amFirst, thanks for explaining “free rider.” I the phrase just this morning and did not know what it mmeant. Second, on the game theory issue, the US had broadcast its intentions by placing hundreds of thousands of troops on Iraqu’s boarder. As many pointed out at the time, it would have been disasterous to pull them out and send them home. Hence, you are correct. There was no reason for F,G and R to commit troops, knowing that the US already had.
JimH (73e0d6) — 10/2/2004 @ 9:36 amDoes this apply equally to _lip_service_ support?
Frankly, I think the US would be content if France, Germany, and Russia contributed zero troops and zero dollars – but Publically supported the effort. “Sorry, we’re overextended, you do it, but… we do wish you luck!”
Al (98e4ad) — 10/2/2004 @ 11:36 amThomas H
I generally agree. Germany being relatively pacifistic (not to mention France’s little sister) wasn’t going to provide troops regardless. With his rapidly deteriorating political position, Schroeder couldn’t go back on his promise to not provide troops, even if Kerry begged him. Based upon our negative Balkan’s experience with Russia along with their heavy handed dealing with Chechnya, I doubt either Bush or Kerry would seriously consider Russian troops.
Having eliminated German & Russian troop considerations, it was still highly likely that we could have gained their acceptance – at the right price. They, along with France, wanted first and foremost that all their contracts, especially those not legally enforce yet (oil primarily), to be recognized by any new Iraqi government. Secondarily, they wanted the inside track on future contracts/trade, not just the immediate reconstruction contracts. Yes, they also wanted all Iraq’s debts to them to be fully recognized, but these were just negotiating chips for the bigger economic (and political influence) bonanza they saw.
I’m convinced Kerry would have given them whatever they wanted. From the debate, he said “What do you need, what do you need now, how much more will it take to get you to join us?” He could have gotten the UN too, because I’m sure he’d have met their requirements – military forces and Iraq under UN control. The UN has such a great track record, on both counts, that I think this would be a reasonable concession.
MaDr (08c688) — 10/2/2004 @ 11:45 amAl, MaDr,
Your points on Germany’s interests are significant. Of Germany, France, and Russia, Germany seems to have achieved only a fleeting local benefit (initial election) from their position while sacrificing a great deal of influence with the US and within the European community.
Germany may well have sacrificed their own best interest while advancing that of France.
As I pointed out, Russia may see itself as being contained and isolated by events in former Wasrsaw Pact nations and by the animosities existing between themselves and the new nations created in the collapse of the USSR. Their efforts to join NATO indicate their valid fear of isolation. Their attempts to forge new economic alliances with their immediate neighbors is a necessity for survival as a player in Europe. Their seriously diminished capability for influence abroad demands that they attend carefully to any, such as Saddam, that offer them opportunity to improve their international stature and influence.
Yet, they are not alone in such a position. What of France? Did not the results of WWII also destroy their empire and contain and isolate them, within their European neighbors?
So long as the US is the guarantor for the freedom of her smaller neighbors, France’s ONLY avenue of expansion is through the EU. With the rejection of the French/German position by much of the EU’s new members, France’s aspirations are, clearly, forestalled. BUT, this only became evident after France had committed herself and Germany to the obstructionist position. Prior to that, France assumed her position of primacy in the EU to be firm and unquestioned. Hence the peevish commentary about nations who “missed a good chance to keep their mouths shut”.
The new alignments being formed in Europe are definite setbacks to French expansion- a phenomenon she now shares with Russia.
Germany placed any aspirations she might have held as secondary, whether by decision or default, by her solidarity with France in a postion that has cost both. The anti-Americanism they exploit is useful only locally. It had no effect on the fanaticism in the Moslem world because their own version of same has its own causes. Any solidarity they may claim with Germany/France for their position is ephemeral because the base cause for Islamic furor is not solely the US, but western values entirely.
The negatives the US may derive from its actions in Iraq ,first, have the potential of being totally cancelled should a free Iraq result. The moral advantages of having provided for a free Afghanistan and Iraq will accrue almost entirely to the Anglosphere and in the face of virulent opposition from the ‘progressive’ left.
The strategic value of a isolated Iran has already worked to the strategic benefit of the US, ie, Libya’s unilateral renunciation of nuclear weapons and greatly diminished overt opposition from Iran and a much more circumspect Syria. Syrian removal of troops from Lebanon can easily be construed as a reaction brought about by the Iraq intervention. The value of these events to the common good is arguable only by those committed against the common good.
The removal of US forces from Saudi Arabia eliminated a point of argument for terrorism (infidels in the Holy Land)and demonstrated that the US had no intention of controlling Saudi land and oil NOR that of Iraq. This only became possible with direct intervention in Iraq.
Secondly, the negatives do not redound to France/Germany/Russia’s benefit because none of these can exhibit a capability of exploiting them, other than locally.
Overall, the advantages of the obstructionist parties seems to be limited and local whereas those of the US are strategic and, very possibly,
Thomas Hazlewood (8c22f4) — 10/2/2004 @ 1:29 pmof lasting imprint on the Mideast.
If I may be unusually succinct, this game-theoretical analysis also assumes one other point: that France, Germany, and Russia have the military capacity to join us in the first place.
The point is arguable: like the rest of Old Europe excepting the Brits, they have drawn down their armed forces to the point where they may well be overextended simply protecting their own borders. Thus, even in the unlikely event that they wanted Hussein removed — and please note, Tom, that it’s entirely possible that FG&R would think that Hussein was not a threat to them, even if they were well aware he was a threat to America — they might have been unable to do anything about it because they simply have insufficient military force.
Dafydd
Dafydd ab Hugh (df2f54) — 10/2/2004 @ 2:05 pmDafydd,
Heh,heh. My apologies if I’ve bloviated.
Regarding your point of the relative weakness of R,G,F forces, if they had actually been inclined to support the US, I have no doubt that the ‘figleaf’ of even those moderate forces would have been gratefully accepted. (Succinct enuff? hehe)
Regards…
Thomas Hazlewood (8c22f4) — 10/2/2004 @ 2:38 pmThomas H
“The moral advantages of having provided for a free Afghanistan and Iraq will accrue almost entirely to the Anglosphere”.
I think your being too conservative in only ascribing “moral advantages”. Even though I have no doubt that most Iraqi resent being “occupied”, I also have no doubt that they will be equally grateful once the coalition leaves. The goodwill gained from Iraqis and their neighbors will be significant. The freedom seed planted in Iraq is already have repercussions in Iran. The mullahs seem to have their hands full these days putting down dissent (not to mention riots).
I can’t help but believe that an Iraqi at some time in the future, if presented with a choice of an Anglophile or Francophile, would reply non.
MaDr (08c688) — 10/2/2004 @ 5:15 pmOne thing that polls lower in Iraq than the US… the UN (At least in the polls I’ve glanced through). The shenanigans when the UN was asked if they’d deign to help arrange the Interim Government were also amusing. And not ‘supremacy of the UN’ affirming.
Al (98e4ad) — 10/3/2004 @ 12:04 am